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Can the CCCTB Alleviate Tax Discrimination  
against Loss-making European Multinational Groups? 
 
Regina Ortmann* and Caren Sureth-Sloane** 
Abstract 
In March 2011, the European Commission submitted a proposal for a Council Directive on an optional 
common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB). If this proposed CCCTB system comes into force, 
taxes calculated under the currently existing system of separate accounting might be replaced by a 
system of group consolidation and formulary apportionment. Then, multinational groups (MNGs) 
would face the decision as to whether to opt for the CCCTB system. Prior research focuses mainly on 
the differences in economic behaviour under both systems in general. By contrast, we study the condi-
tions under which one or the other tax system is preferable from the perspective of an MNG, with a 
particular focus on loss-offsets. We identify four effects that determine the decision of an MNG: the 
tax-utilization of losses, the allocation of the tax base, the dividend and intragroup interest taxation. 
We find mixed results, e.g., that the CCCTB system proves advantageous for increasing loss/profit 
streams (e.g. from start-ups or R&D projects) of the individual group entities, whereas the system of 
separate accounting is beneficial for decreasing profit/loss streams (e.g. caused by a decrease in return 
from a mature product). The results of our analysis are helpful for MNGs facing the decision as to 
whether to opt for the CCCTB system and can also support legislators and politicians in the EU but 
also in other regions in their tax reform discussions. 
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1 Introduction 
In March 2011, the European Commission (2011) submitted a proposal for a Council Directive on a 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). If this directive comes into force, multinational 
groups (MNGs) operating within the EU would be able to opt for the CCCTB system and calculate 
their taxable profits on a consolidated basis. However, even if the proposed system were to reduce the 
over-taxation arising from the widespread application of the system of separate accounting (SA) cur-
rently in place in Europe, it would not necessarily always be advantageous for a European MNG to opt 
for the CCCTB system. To make the right choice, MNGs would have to weigh the advantages and 
disadvantages of the CCCTB system against those of the respective national laws that are crucial un-
der SA. Especially, MNGs that comprise a mixture of profit and loss-making entities face a complex 
decision. Assuming the CCCTB system as outlined in the Council Directive, we identify factors that 
determine whether a European temporarily loss-making MNG should opt for the CCCTB system. 
The differences in loss-offset regulations under the system of SA and under the CCCTB system con-
stitute an important trade-off that is crucial for the advantageousness of either system. Whereas under 
the CCCTB system MNGs can make use of the cross-border loss-offset, it does not allow parent com-
panies and subsidiaries carrying losses backward. By contrast, some European countries do allow loss 
carry-backs under their domestic laws. However, the vast majority has not implemented cross-border 
loss-offset provisions. Furthermore, losses can be carried forward indefinitely under the CCCTB sys-
tem, whereas in many EU countries loss carry-forwards are either limited in amount or time. Beside 
the loss-offset provisions, other tax base effects matter as well and make the decision even more com-
plex. Tax base effects emerge, e.g., from a deviating allocation of taxable profits to each country 
across the respective countries or from a differing treatment of intercompany interest payments and 
dividends under both systems. Against this rather complex background it is important to investigate 
under which conditions which of these two systems causes a lower tax burden for MNGs than the 
other. 
We model different combinations of profit/loss streams for a European MNG. The time patterns and 
magnitudes of the profits and losses are key determinants of the advantageous nature of one tax system 
over the other. In a first step, as an example and to model common loss-offset rules, we examine an 
MNG domiciled in France and Germany. We select these countries as representative examples for two 
reasons. First, Germany and France are the biggest economies in the EU (see The World Bank 2012) 
and second, the implementation of a CCCTB between those two countries is more likely than between 
any other EU countries. France and Germany have already attempted to establish a bilateral CCCTB 
(see German Federal Ministry of Finance 2012). Since the loss-offset rules in France and Germany are 
highly specific we extent in a next step the scope of our analysis for tax system characteristics com-
mon in other EU Member States. We generalize our model for different types of loss-offset provisions 
that are representative for the variety of provisions in place in the EU Member States.  
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Our model enables us to identify four effects that determine whether one or the other tax system is 
advantageous: the tax utilization of losses during the considered time frame, the different allocation of 
the tax base between the Member States under each tax system and the taxation of intragroup interest 
and dividends. The analysis reveals that for most combinations of profit/loss streams, the CCCTB 
system proves advantageous. However, the system of SA tends to be advantageous if countries allow 
to carry losses back and if investments generate time sequences of profits and losses that allow for the 
utilization of these loss carry-backs. Counter-intuitively – and in contrast to previous studies, the 
CCCTB system is no longer unconditionally preferable if a cross-border loss-offset is available. De-
pending on the timing and magnitude of the entities’ profits and losses, the benefit from loss carry-
backs under SA may exceed the advantage of the cross-border loss-offset under the CCCTB. The 
model highlights that in some EU countries that do not tax intragroup dividends and allow an unre-
stricted loss carry-forward the advantageousness of either system is determined by the allocation of the 
tax base among EU countries only. 
Cross-border loss-offset has become an important topic for multinational groups in the European Un-
ion (EU) in recent years. In the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis, in many EU countries 
the amount of incurred losses and loss carry-forwards has increased significantly. Furthermore, in 
particular, start-ups and R&D investment as examples for innovative activities, which are crucial for 
MNGs’ future performance, often are characterized by initial losses. Under the system of separate 
accounting (SA) currently applied in Europe, MNGs often are unable to use their losses to decrease 
their tax payments. Limited cross-border loss-offsets1 ultimately result in an over-taxation of MNGs 
(see European Commission 2011, p. 4; Andersson 2007, p. 98, Scheffler 2005, p. 156). The European 
Commission (2006) stated that “the limited availability of cross-border loss relief is one of the most 
significant obstacles to cross-border business activity”. Thus, the European Commission aims to intro-
duce a common tax base to address those provisions in the European tax systems that limit the growth 
of companies seeking to benefit from the European single market (see European Commission 2010, p. 
18). However, the implementation of the CCCTB is far from clear. In April 2012, the European Par-
liament adopted a resolution on the CCCTB Directive and proposed certain amendments to the Com-
mission’s initial version.2 In June 2015 the Commission presented an action plan to re-launch the 
CCCTB project (see European Commission 2015). The debate continues on how to refine the CCCTB 
system in order to facilitate an agreement between the Member States. 
Even though the cross-border loss-offset is one of the main pillars of the proposed CCCTB system, 
there is little research that compares the proposed CCCTB system and the current system of SA with 
regard to loss-offset possibilities. The few existing studies presume simplified, stylized national loss-
                                                 
1
  Only Denmark, Austria and Italy allow under certain conditions consolidated taxation of MNGs (see Schuch-
ter and Kras (2014), p. 13; Ambagtsheer-Pakarinen (2014), p. 13; Gallo (2014), p. 14). 
2
  As it is uncertain if and to what extent these proposed amendments will be considered in the course of a po-
tential CCCTB implementation, we disregard them in this analysis. 
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offset provisions and account – if at all – for a few representative profit/loss scenarios. We expand 
these studies by accounting for national tax characteristics in detail and by investigating implications 
about the tax systems in dependence on a vast range of different profit/loss patterns. Moreover, we 
highlight the impact of a deviating tax treatment of intercompany interest payments and dividends on 
the advantageousness of both systems. 
This article first provides an overview over the most relevant literature (Section 2), followed by an 
explanation of the legal basis of both tax systems (Section 3). In Section 4, the Franco-German model 
is introduced. The numerical analysis in Section 5 compares the after-tax outcome for the MNG, given 
different combinations of profit/loss streams of both group companies between both tax systems. Fur-
thermore, the specific Franco-German model is generalized to account also for other EU Member 
States. Finally, the main results of the analysis are summarized (Section 6). 
2 Prior Literature 
Two main streams of research are relevant to our research question. First, prior research examines the 
impact of loss treatment on investment in either an interstate or cross-border loss-offset situation. Au-
erbach (1986), Auerbach and Poterba (1987) and Majd and Myers (1987) find that the absence of loss-
offset possibilities discourages investment. Against this background, we expect that the design of loss-
offset rules also matters for the advantageousness of the CCCTB system and of the system of SA. 
Both tax systems allow the offsetting of losses, but differ in the design of the rules. Hence, we investi-
gate how specific loss-offset provisions impact the relative attractiveness of the underlying tax sys-
tems. 
In prior research Barlev and Levy (1975) distinguish between loss carry-forwards and carry-backs, 
which are both applied under the system of SA in our extended model. In contrast, Donnely and 
Young (2002) focus on the loss-offset by means of group consolidation as applied under the CCCTB 
system. By determining the expected value of tax savings in different countries, Barlev and Levy 
(1975) find that in addition to loss carry-forwards, carry-back provisions are highly valuable and can 
improve the economic conditions for companies greatly. Donnely and Young (2002) conclude that 
under group taxation regimes, the tax value of losses is highest. In a study about the Austrian cross-
border group taxation regime, Pummerer and Steckel (2005) investigate possible implications of such 
a system under uncertainty. They conclude that positive effects of the cross-border group taxation 
regime might be balanced out by disadvantages due to limitations in loss carry-forwards. In our analy-
sis we succeed to further disentangle the effects from cross-border loss-offset and limitations in loss 
carry-forwards. In line with Donnely and Young (2002), Pummerer and Steckel (2005) and Barlev and 
Levy (1975), we expect that the cross-border loss-offset and the unlimited loss carry-forward under 
the CCCTB system and the loss carry-back provisions under the system of SA increase the relative 
attractiveness of each tax system. However, from their studies we cannot deduce the specific condi-
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tions under which one tax system is preferable.  
Based on data of German multinationals, Dreßler and Overesch (2013) analyse empirically how the 
treatment of potential losses impacts multinational investment. In contrast to the analytical study of 
Barlev and Levy (1975), Dreßler and Overesch (2013) find no statistically significant effects of loss 
carry-back and, in contrast to Donnely and Young (2002), they find only mixed evidence that group 
loss-offset provisions foster investment. However, their results suggest that limiting the time frame for 
loss carry-forwards has detrimental investment effects for companies with a high probability of incur-
ring losses. The limitation of loss carry-forwards, e.g., as applied under SA by the minimum taxation 
in France and Germany, reduces the attractiveness of SA. While previous studies often disregard de-
tailed loss-offset rules, we integrate them into our model and find loss carry-forward and carry-back, 
as well as cross-border loss-offsets are significant features of a tax system and a driver as regards 
whether an MNG is likely to opt for the CCCTB system. We expand the previous studies also by tak-
ing account of different profit/loss time patterns. Thus, we are able to draw conclusions about the ef-
fects of differently designed loss-offset regimes, depending on different profit/loss-scenarios. 
The second literature stream deals with the shift from SA to consolidation and formulary apportion-
ment. As we do not focus on profit-shifting activities under the two systems (like, e.g., Klassen and 
Shackelford 1998; Goolsbee and Maydew 2000; Mintz and Smart 2004), we refer only to those studies 
that investigate at least to some extent the differences in loss-offset possibilities. Using a model-theory 
approach, Gérard and Weiner (2003) compare the impact of cross-border loss-offset and consolidation 
under a system of consolidation and formulary apportionment and under a system of SA for the in-
vestment behaviour of an MNG. They assume that under SA, no loss-offset or a cross-border loss-
offset is applied. Thus, contrary to our approach, they do not include the possibility of a separate per 
country loss-offset, which is currently common in EU Member States. They show that cross-border 
loss-offsets mitigate the reactions to tax changes, whereas consolidation and formulary apportionment 
boosts the sensitivity thereto. 
Using a numerical analysis, Dahle and Bäumer (2009) compare the effects of selected loss-offset limi-
tations under SA with those under the CCCTB system and the European tax allocation system for 
MNGs’ cross-border investment. While we consider different profit/loss time frames and also include 
in our investigation currently applied EU loss-offset rules, they restrict their analysis to selected in-
creasing/constant cash-flow streams. They conclude that the replacement of SA by the CCCTB system 
would generally increase profitability due to cross-border loss-offsets.3 By contrast, in this article we 
find mixed results and clarify that the CCCTB system – even in loss scenarios – may not be beneficial. 
Oestreicher, Keser and Kimpel (2013) study loss-making corporate groups and their decision regard-
                                                 
3
  For more literature regarding asymmetric taxation in an international setting that does not specifically refer to 
the CCCTB, see Lyon and Silverstein (1995) and Niemann (2004a). 
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ing whether to opt for the CCCTB system. In contrast to the present article, they shed light on the de-
cision-making process from a behavioural perspective. Their experiment with human subjects indi-
cates that loss-exposed groups tend to opt for the CCCTB system. Their results are mostly in line with 
the outcomes of our model. 
To our knowledge, there is, as yet, no analytical investigation that compares SA and CCCTB with 
regard to loss-offset rules and different profit/loss time frames. This is surprising, given that prior re-
search indicates that both loss-offset rules and cash flow time structures are crucial for investment 
decisions. In this article, we aim to fill this void. As the lack of cross-border loss-offset under SA is 
“one of the most important obstacles to cross-border economic activity” (European Commission 2001, 
p. 39), loss-offset rules under a CCCTB system may be a promising avenue to improve the environ-
ment for cross-border investment. We identify conditions for such an improvement for MNGs. Our 
results allow investors to anticipate the tax effects in loss scenarios, and also allow tax reformers to 
improve their estimation of the expected behaviour of MNGs on CCCTB enforcement. These results 
are particularly noteworthy in the aftermath of economic crises, which are likely to generate huge 
amounts of loss carry-forwards. Thus, our findings may contribute to national and European tax re-
form discussions. 
3 Legal Basis 
3.1 CCCTB 
Here, we assume that the CCCTB system will come into force as proposed in the draft of the Directive 
(see European Commission 2011). The main purpose of the CCCTB project is to enable the consoli-
dated computation of taxable income for corporations operating within the EU (see Barenfeld 2007, p. 
259). Thus, losses incurred by one taxpayer are automatically offset against profits of other group 
entities (see Temme, Sporken and Okten 2011, p. 323). The consolidation eliminates intragroup trans-
actions, such as transfer pricing transactions and interest and dividend payments (article 59). The con-
solidated tax base is subsequently reallocated to the group members by using a formula-based sharing 
mechanism (see European Commission 2011, p. 8 (iii)). The formula takes into account three equally 
weighted factors, namely sales, labour and assets. The CCCTB system does not imply a harmonized 
tax rate. The Member States still have the right to tax their share of the tax base at their national corpo-
rate tax rate (article 103). MNGs are allowed to carry forward losses indefinitely and without limita-
tion as to the amount (article 43), whereas a loss carry-back is not allowed at all. EU resident compa-
nies and non-EU resident companies with permanent establishments or subsidiaries in the EU may opt 
for the CCCTB system (see Piot, Sigurdardottir and Rasch 2011, p. 415). In cases where only EU 
companies are involved, MNGs that wish to opt for the CCCTB must use a special form (listed in 
Annex 1) and are subject to the corporate taxation system of the respective countries (listed in Annex 
2, article 2). The system is based on an “all-in, all-out” approach (article 55 c)), that is, companies 
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which belong to the same group may not opt for the CCCTB system separately, but only jointly with 
other group members (see Temme, Sporken and Okten 2011, p. 324). Once a company has opted into 
the system for the first time, it must apply the CCCTB system for at least five consecutive tax years 
(article 105 (1)). 
3.2 Germany and France 
In the course of France and Germany’s efforts to establish a mutual CCCTB, Germany and France 
matched their loss-offset provisions. Thus, the loss carry-forward and carry-back provisions are now 
almost identical in both countries. Losses that are not carried back “may only be carried forward to be 
set off against the first € 1 million of net income in a given year without restriction” (Perdelwitz 2014, 
p. 9) in both countries (see also Gaoua 2014, p. 11). The remaining loss carry-forward can only be 
offset against up to 60% in Germany and up to 50% in France of the net income exceeding € 1 million. 
There is no time limitation for loss carry-forwards in both countries. Corporate taxpayers are also al-
lowed to carry losses back amounting up to € 1 million for one year in both countries (see Gaoua 
2014, p. 11; Perdelwitz 2014, p. 9). The loss carry-back entitles a French taxpayer to a tax credit. “The 
tax credit may be used during the following [five] years, and will be refundable in the sixth year” 
(Gaoua 2014, p. 11). In Germany, the loss carry-back is directly offset against the net income of the 
previous year and leads to an immediate tax refund. Furthermore, neither France nor Germany current-
ly allows cross-border loss-offsets. 
The effects resulting from dividend taxation are crucial for the following analysis, as well. The divi-
dends that the German parent receives from the French subsidiary are tax-exempt, with a lump sum of 
5% of the gross dividend considered as a non-deductible expense (see Perdelwitz 2014, p. 13). France 
levies withholding taxes neither on these dividends in line with the Parent-Subsidiary Directive nor on 
interest payments (see Gaoua 2014, p. 23). Moreover, interest payments are fully deductible from the 
tax base under both national tax codes (see Perdelwitz 2014, p. 7; Gaoua 2014, p. 8) insofar as thin 
capitalization rules do not apply .4 In addition to the classic corporate tax, companies in Germany and 
France are also subject to a local business tax and a surcharge. The different kinds of taxes are taken 
into account in our model by the applied tax rate.5 The two tax systems explained above are used in 
our extended model in Section 4.3 
4 Model 
In the following, we introduce a model taking into account the most noteworthy loss-related character-
                                                 
4
  For the considered numerical examples, the safe harbour rule applies for the deductibility of interest in 
France. 
5 
 Also Kiesewetter and Mugler (2006) take the local business tax into account via the applied tax rates. As the 
German local business tax is of key significance for the taxation of corporations, its treatment is also crucial 
under the CCCTB system. However, so far it has failed to resolve whether and, if so, how the German local 
business tax would be integrated into the CCCTB system (see Scheffler et al. 2013, p. 28.). We assume that 
the local business tax is applied under the CCCTB system as applied under the German tax code. Consequent-
ly, we apply the same statutory profit tax rate for Germany under both systems. 
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istics of both tax systems. We assume that the parent company is based in Germany and its wholly-
owned subsidiary in France. Both companies are fully equity-financed and have invested in a national 
real investment project that generates cash flows and gives rise to depreciation. During the period 
under review, this project is taken as the companies’ only business activity. The French subsidiary 
distributes all profits, in the form of dividends, to its German parent at the end of each year.6 By as-
sumption, the German company uses these funds either to invest in the capital market or to redeem a 
loan. It carries out the capital market investments in Germany, since the German after-tax interest rate 
is the higher one (see Niemann and Treisch 2006, p. 1020; Gérard and Princen 2012, p. 10).7 
To focus on the effects of the respective tax systems, we assume in the basic scenario that the compa-
nies do not adjust their investment behaviour (e.g. reallocate their assets or workforce) in order to 
achieve a more tax-efficient situation through formulary apportionment under the CCCTB system8 and 
that companies do not engage in profit shifting via transfer pricing under the system of SA. We take 
the behaviour of taxpayers as given and focus instead on inherent differences in the two alternate tax 
regimes. As we think the MNGs’ efforts to optimize the tax structure are nearly similar under both 
systems our results should not be biased towards one system if we abstract from behavioural adapta-
tions. Kiesewetter et al. (2014) support our view. They find that the implementation of the CCCTB 
would not aggravate to shift profits for MNGs. They argue that formula apportionment simply offers 
new methods for tax planning. Instead of shifting profits via transfer pricing, MNGs manipulate book 
values of assets. Furthermore, Nielsen et al. (2003) find that under imperfect competition MNGs under 
both tax systems would use the same tax optimization channel– namely transfer pricing – in order to 
reduce the tax burden. Under formulary apportionment transfer pricing is used to manipulate the sales 
factor of the group entities.   
 
Furthermore, we neglect compliance costs (see Bettendorf et al. 2010, p. 577; Devereux and Loretz 
2008, p.3) and abstract from shareholder taxation. Given heterogeneous shareholders with different tax 
brackets, investment decisions in MNGs are typically made without reference to shareholder-level 
taxation (see Cooper and Knittel 2010, p. 52; Egger and Loretz 2010, p. 1025; Niemann and Treisch 
2006, p. 1016; Oestreicher and Koch 2011, p. 70). By simplifying our analysis in this way, the impact 
of the different loss-offset mechanisms under the two tax systems can be highlighted. Annual depreci-
ation of the underlying asset is assumed to be straight-line and identical under both systems.9 Further-
more, we assume that neither France nor Germany levies a different corporate tax rate under the 
                                                 
6
  A yearly dividend distribution is also assumed by Gérard and Princen (2012), p. 5. 
7
  Taking into account the statutory profit tax rates in France (38.93%) and Germany (30.95%), the interest rate 
and the dividend taxation, Germany turns out to be the country of choice for financial investments. 
8
  Also Devereux and Loretz (2008), p. 2; Oestreicher and Koch (2011), p. 92 abstract from behavioural changes 
of firms. 
9
  We interpret depreciations under both tax systems as a proxy for all other kinds of non-cash accruals. See, 
e.g., Niemann (2004b), p. 362, and Dahle and Bäumer (2009), p. 8. 
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CCCTB system than under their domestic systems.10 By assumption, the group fulfils all eligibility 
requirements for the CCCTB system.11 We also assume a perfect capital market with a pre-tax debit 
interest rate for borrowing identical to the pre-tax credit interest rate (see Dahle 2011, p. 61). The pre-
tax interest rates in France and Germany are assumed to be identical. We take the after-tax net cash 
flow as a criterion for identifying tax effects. 
We describe in the following exemplarily the calculation of the MNGs’ net cash flows in only one 
period and, on this basis, demonstrate the determination of cash flows and tax payments in all periods 
of the time frame under review. 
4.1 Separate accounting 
The MNG maximizes its after-tax net cash flows. The net cash flow  of the MNG in period  
under the system of SA is determined by summing up the gross cash flows 	
 , 
	and the inter-
est income (pre-tax interest rate   times the financial investment of the previous period 
 , 12)	and subtracting the tax payments  , 13 of both group companies: 
 = 	
 + 
 +  ∗  +  ∗  −  − . (1) 
If the French company incurs a positive net cash flow   it distributes a dividend to the German 
company. Under the principle of prudence, the dividend distribution is limited to the net cash flow less 
depreciation (see Meller 2010, p. 148). Given that the distribution limitation applies, surplus liquidity 
amounting to the value of the depreciation is retained in the French company. The French company is 
assumed to reinvest this excess liquidity in the French capital market. Whenever the French company 
incurs losses, we assume that it takes out a loan from the German company. Although the French 
company is fully equity-financed, we assume that all of its means are bound in assets or projects and 
thus are not available to compensate for the loss. The bound means are assumed to be sufficient to 
serve as collateral for loans taken from the parent company. Due to the positive pre-tax present value 
of earnings it is assured that the entities only temporarily incur losses in our setting. Thus, the subsidi-
ary is at no point in time exposed to insolvency risk. The French company is assumed to redeem 10% 
of the principal amount 
 in the following period.14 Furthermore, it pays interest at the market rate 
                                                 
10
  Also, Oestreicher and Koch (2011); Fuest et al. (2007) and Devereux and Loretz (2008) assume for their 
empirical studies the same tax rate under the CCCTB systems. 
11
  We refer here in particular to the two-part test that determines the membership of a company in a group by 
control and ownership (article 54). 
12
  If variables used for building the relevant models do not have the same values under both systems, the varia-
bles are additionally labelled with “SA” or “CCCTB”, respectively. 
13
  The formulas are based on the approach of Schanz and Schanz (2011), pp. 275-293, and adjusted for CCCTB 
and separate accounting purposes in our setting. 
14
 Even if 100% were redeemed in the second period, our results only change in a few border cases. The interest 
and dividend taxation effects prove to have a rather small impact on our results. We do not account for the fu-
ture effects resulting from the redemption of the remaining principal amount explicitly since it would increase 
the complexity of the model tremendously. Exemplary conducted numerical simulations support this approach 
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to the German parent. If the company redeems the principal amount of the loan, the dividend in eq. (2) 
is determined following deduction of this payment. If the German parent is short on funds, it borrows 
from the capital market to fill the gap. Finally, the fraction of the French net cash flow that exceeds the 
value of the depreciation and the redemption of the principal amount is distributed to the German par-
ent company as a dividend . The German parent company invests all of its surplus liquidity in the 
German capital market (see Bäumer 2011, p. 72; Sureth and Bäumer 2010, pp. 176-179). 
 = 	 !	"
 +  ∗  − − 
 − 0.1 ∗ 
; 0'.  (2) 
We obtain the tax payments  to be made by each company by multiplying the tax rate ( 	 by the 
tax base ).  In both countries, the tax base )  is determined by the adjusted gross income 
*+	, the loss-offset ,- and the loss carry-back ,).15 
) = max1*+ − ,-; 02−,) . (3) 
Apart from the addition of 5% of the gross dividend under German law, the adjusted gross income 
*+ is similarly determined in both countries: 
*+ = 
 − 
 +  ∗  , (4) 
*+ = 	
 − 	
 +  ∗  + 0.05 ∗ . (5) 
Eq. (6) reflects the determination of the loss-offset for the German company. The equation for the 
French company is similar, except that 0.5 (instead of 0.6) of the € 1 million exceeding amount of the 
net income may be utilized to offset losses. 
,- = 4",; !"*+; 0'; 1,000,000 + 0.6	6 !"*+; 0' − 1,000,0007'. (6) 
The loss carry-forward , at the end of period , that can be utilized in period  + 1, can be derived 
from the following equation for the German and the French company: 
, = , −410;*+2 − ,) − ,-. (7) 
France and Germany allow for an annual loss carry-back ,) up to € 1 million: 
,) = min :1,000,000;max"TB= ; 0';max"−AGI=AB; 0'C, (8) 
As the German company receives all profits from the French company in form of dividends or com-
pensates losses that incur in the French company, the financial investment   of the German 
company in period t is equal to the MNG’s net cash flow   and the financial investment 
  of the French company is equal to zero. Just in case the French company incurs profits 
                                                                                                                                                        
as they indicate that the present value of these effects is negligible small. 
15 As eq. 3 is valid for both the French company and the German company, we decided not to label the variables 
with the country-specific abbreviations. 
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(
 +  ∗  − )	that are higher than the depreciation 
 , the financial investment 
  of the German company amounts – due to the former mentioned principal of prudence – to 
 − 
 and the financial investment   of the French company is equal to 
 . 
The model defined in this subsection depicts the main legal characteristics of the national French and 
German tax law that we take into account for our analysis. 
4.2. CCCTB 
Similar to the system of SA, net cash flow under the CCCTB system is determined as follows: 
DDDEF = 	
 + 
 +  ∗ DDDEF +  ∗ DDDEF − DDDEF − DDDEF . (9) 
The taxes to be paid under the CCCTB system result from the application of the German and French 
tax rate to the respective shares of the group tax base. The apportionment factor G denotes the share of 
the group tax base that is allocated to the German company. Thus, (1 − G) of the tax base is allocated 
to the French company. 
DDDEF = DDDEF + DDDEF = (G ∗ (	
 + (1 − G) ∗ (
) ∗ 	)DDDEF, (10) 
where 0	≤ G ≤ 1. 
The tax base under the CCCTB system )DDDEF consists of the adjusted gross income *+DDDEF, inso-
far as it is positive, minus a potential loss-offset ,-DDDEF at the group level. If the sum of the adjusted 
gross incomes is negative, the tax base will take on a value of zero. 
)DDDEF = max1*+DDDEF; 02 − ,-DDDEF, (11) 
with the adjusted gross income *+DDDEF: 
*+DDDEF = 	
 − 	
 +  ∗ DDDEF +	
 − 
+ ∗ DDDEF . (12) 
The amount to be offset under the CCCTB system is restricted by the lesser of two terms: the adjusted 
gross income and the loss carry-forward accumulated in the previous periods. As a minimum taxation 
provision is not implemented, we obtain for the loss-offset ,-DDDEF: 
,-DDDEF = min :,DDDEF; !1*+DDDEF; 02C. (13) 
The loss carry-forward ,DDDEF under the CCCTB system is determined in the same way as under 
the system of SA, except that no loss carry-back needs to be considered: 
,DDDEF = ,DDDEF −410; *+DDDEF2 − ,-DDDEF. (14) 
Note that the former mentioned principle of prudence is purely an accounting principle that applies 
under the CCCTB system as well. Thus, the financial investments per country DDDEF  and 
DDDEF  in period t are determined analogously to the financial investment per country under the 
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system of SA. If the profits of the French company (
 +  ∗ DDDEF − DDDEF) are higher 
than the depreciation 
, the German financial investment DDDEF  is equal to DDDEF- 
 
and the French one DDDEF  equals 
. If the French profits are not higher than 
, the German 
financial investment DDDEF  is equal to the MNG’s net cash flow DDDEF and the French one 
DDDEF  is equal to zero. 
Based on the models for the system of SA and the CCCTB system, we built up the financial plans for 
the numerical analysis. 
5 Numerical Analysis 
Providing a detailed picture of the loss-offset rules under either system in a closed-form, multi-period, 
theoretical model is difficult, as non-linear functions and condition-based provisions must be taken 
into consideration. Even in short-period perspectives, analytical models become inscrutable and 
scarcely allow any generalizable economic conclusions. As a result, we are forced to fall back on fi-
nancial plans with numerical examples to capture specific conditions from the analysis.16 Financial 
plans allow us to deal with complex rules also in multi-period settings. In the numerical analysis, we 
calculate the after-tax future value (see Sureth, Mehrmann and Dahle 2010, p. 168) of the underlying 
investment of the MNG by summing up the compounded net cash flows of each period under consid-
eration. 
5.1 Scope of the numerical analysis 
By considering a continuous period, the values of the previously introduced variables17 are functions 
of the cash flows 	
 , 
 and the depreciation 	
, 
 from the current or prior periods and 
the exogenous variables, i.e. , (
 , 	(	
.18 Consequently, the decision to opt for the CCCTB system 
ultimately depends only on the cash flow time pattern19 of the French and the German companies, the 
corresponding depreciation and the exogenous variables. The following analysis focuses on the impact 
of different combinations of time patterns and magnitudes of cash flows and depreciation on the rela-
tive advantageousness of either tax system. By assumption, the decision as to whether to opt for the 
CCCTB system must be made at the beginning of the first period. 
To demonstrate the tax effects, we consider pre-tax cash flows for both the German and the French 
company that vary in increments of € 200,000 between -€ 3 million and € 3 million in the first period. 
                                                 
16
  This approach is in line with Majd and Myers (1987); Haegert and Kramm (1977); Niemann (2004b). 
17
  These are the adjusted gross incomes, the tax bases, the loss carry-forwards, the loss carry-backs, the loss-
offsets, the dividend payments and the financial investments. 
18
  The apportionment factor β consists partly of a fixed component (allocation of assets and labour) and partly 
also on the cash flows as a proxy for the sales of the respective company. See Section 5.2.1. 
19
  Earlier analyses have already shown that cash flow time patterns are important for potential loss-offsets. See 
Barlev and Levy (1975), p. 178; Haegert and Kramm (1977), p. 205; Niemann (2004a), p. 24; Niemann 
(2004b), p. 363; Dahle (2011), p. 62. 
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This range of values is sufficient to illustrate which cash flow pattern is advantageous for which tax 
system. To analyse the effect of different loss-offset rules, both the French company and the German 
company are required to have at least one tax year with losses. In order to ensure this and, further-
more, to ensure that the alternative time patterns and magnitudes of the pre-tax cash flows are still 
comparable, we assume that the pre-tax present value of the cash flows of each company is always 
€ 100,000.20 Thus, a specific growth factor J must be applied to the first period’s cash flows to deter-
mine the cash flows for the subsequent period. This factor is calculated as follows: 
ε = LL,LLLDMDM∗(NO)PM. (15) 
Using eq. (15) leads to a high positive cash flow in the first period and a high negative cash flow in the 
second period, and vice versa, for each company. This determination of the cash flows in both periods 
guarantees that a change in the ranking of the alternative tax systems is impacted only by the different 
taxation procedures. 
Nevertheless, the determination of positive and negative pre-tax cash flows is not sufficient to ensure 
that a tax loss or profit arises, as the tax base depends also on the interest payments/income, on depre-
ciation allowances and, in addition, on 5% of the gross dividend under the system of SA. However, the 
values of the crucial variables are chosen in the numerical analysis in such a way that both companies 
always face one profit period and one loss period under both systems. The depreciation , amounting 
to € 30,000 for both companies 	
 = 
 = , is chosen in such a way that the French and Ger-
man investment projects are worthwhile after taxes.21 We use effective statutory profit tax rates for 
Germany and France of 30.95% and 38.93%, respectively, as computed by the Centre for European 
Economic Research (see Spengel et al. 2014). Furthermore, a pre-tax debit and credit interest rate of 
2% is assumed.22   
We assume that remaining loss carry-forwards at the end of the second period may be offset against 
profits of other future investment projects (see Oestreicher and Koch 2011, p. 80). Using a two peri-
                                                 
20
  Assuming equal after-tax present values of the cash flows of both companies under one tax system, and taking 
this case as a benchmark for the analysis of the respective other tax system, would not reveal the inherent dif-
ferences between Germany and France in the former tax system and is thus inappropriate for our analysis. 
21
  Whether or not an investment project is profitable depends in part on the size of the initial investment, which 
we do not refer to here explicitly. However, we assume that the initial investment is equal to the sum of the 
depreciation allowances over the useful life of the underlying asset. We choose the depreciations such that the 
net profit margins for both companies are in line with commonly observable market margins. In case of very 
smooth earnings of both companies (QR = QR = 0) the overall tax payments are lowest under both sys-
tems and thus the average net profit margins are highest after the assumed two periods. In this high-profit case 
the net profit margin amounts to around 25%. This margin is in line with the net profit margins that are com-
mon in the most profitable industries in 2014 (see Sageworks 2014).  
22
 The effective interest rates for lending and borrowing published by the German Federal Bank (Deutsche Bun-
desbank) are close to 2% for corporate entities for a time horizon of two years: interest rate for lending 
amounts to 2.22% (German Federal Bank, 2015b) and for borrowing amounts to 2.43% (German Federal 
Bank 2015a), both for for June 2015. 
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ods-model allows us to capture the decisive characteristics of both tax systems and simultaneously to 
single out the loss induced implications. The main differences in the utilization of losses between the 
two systems already arise in the first two periods since the group can make use of the loss carry-back 
under SA while not under CCCTB. Although in the following periods the group may use remaining 
loss carry-forwards under SA, however, the overall tax benefit from loss-offset under the CCCTB 
system is greater. Thus, and in order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, it is adequate to esti-
mate the future tax effects from loss carry-forwards. Empirical evidence suggests that the remaining 
loss carry-forwards of both companies can be valued at S = 40% of their face value under the sys-
tem of SA.23 As the possibilities to offset losses tend to be better under the CCCTB system, we assume 
that SDDDEF = 45% of the loss carry-forwards may be utilized.24 We test the robustness of our result 
with respect to these values in the sensitivity analysis.  
5.2 After-tax future values 
The following two figures illustrate how the MNG’s after-tax future values under the CCCTB system 
and under the system of SA, respectively, depend on the “earnings”. For the purpose of this paper, 
“earnings” denotes “cash flows 	less depreciation ” of the German and French company. Here, we 
refer to the after-tax future values as relative decision criteria since they allow us to compare the deci-
sions effects of the respective tax systems directly. The values for the German and French earnings are 
plotted in increments of € 200,000. However, we consider that two periods, the abscissa and the ordi-
nate are scales with regard to “cash flows less depreciation in the first period”. As the cash flows of 
the second period are endogenously determined by the growth factor J, the corresponding earnings for 
the second period do not have to be plotted explicitly. The disparity in the future values is, under both 
tax systems, mainly driven by the utilization of losses. The more that losses may be utilized during the 
time frame under consideration, the higher the after-tax future values. 
5.2.1 CCCTB system 
The group tax base under the CCCTB system is allocated to the French company and the German 
company according to the apportionment formula. We assume that the formula factors of assets and 
labour are equally allocated between both companies, so that 50% of these factors are attributed to 
                                                 
23
  Empirical evidence indicates that approximately 40% of German losses may later be offset against profits. See 
Schneider (1988), p. 1222; see also Niemann and Treisch (2006), p. 1020; Haegert and Kramm (1977), p. 205. 
Furthermore, a more recent study by Kager, Schanz and Niemann (2011) supports our assumption. Using in-
formation from a questionnaire sent to German DAX30 companies they find evidence that the share of utiliz-
able losses is substantially lower than the total stock of tax losses. We refer to their results and calculate the 
average of the ratios of the estimated amount of useable losses divided by estimated total stock of tax losses 
for the companies listed in Table 8, p. 116, of their study. The average share of utilizable losses amounts to 
41%. Note, we dropped companies with missing variables. As the German and the French provisions for loss 
carry-forwards are almost similar, we assume that this evaluation holds for the French company as well. 
24
  Due to the cross-border loss-offset and the non-existence of the minimum and dividend taxation, the possibili-
ties to offset losses might be better under the CCCTB system. That implies that losses tend to get offset earlier 
under the CCCTB system (timing effect) and that there is an increased likelihood for a complete loss-offset in 
a reasonable time.  
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each company in both periods.25 The accumulation of financial assets in Germany does not change the 
asset allocation between both companies, as financial assets are disregarded for determining the asset 
factor. The sales factor for each company is assumed to vary in line with the respective pre-tax cash 
flows. We take the magnitude of the pre-tax cash flows as a proxy for the magnitude of the sales of 
every company.26 If the pre-tax cash flow is negative for one company, we assume that this company 
does not engage in any sales, so that 100% of the sales are generated by the other company. In that 
extreme case, the group tax base is apportioned to the companies in the proportion of 33% to 67%.27 
For varying French and German earnings we obtain the future earnings that are illustrated in Fig. 1. 
The highest future values (approximately € 175,000) emerge for that half of the combinations of 
French and German earnings that result in a negative or zero CCCTB in the first period (combinations 
of area 1).28 For the other half of the combinations (combinations of area 2), that lead to a positive 
CCCTB in the first period, the future values decrease with increasing French and German earnings. 
When the German and French earnings take the maximum considered value of approximately € 3 mil-
lion, the lowest future value of -€ 985,679 occurs. 
A negative or zero CCCTB in the first period (area 1) leads to the highest future values, as all losses 
can be utilized to decrease the tax burden in the second period. Thus, area 1 represents full loss-offset 
scenarios. The loss carry-forward of the first period may be utilized to offset a large share of the taxa-
ble profits of the second period. By contrast, a positive CCCTB in the first period (area 2) leads to 
lower future values, as the resulting losses of the second period may not be utilized during the time 
interval considered. Taxes must be paid on the profits of the first period, whereas the losses of the 
second period are evaluated at only SDDDEF = 45% to offset future profits. By increasing first period’s 
earnings of a group company, the relative gap between taxes paid in the first period and the assigned 
present value of the future tax refunds for the loss carry-forwards of the second period increases, as 
                                                 
25
  As both group companies incur the same present value of pre-tax cash flows, we presume that both companies 
invested the same amount of money in their respective projects. Assuming that the investment involves the 
same level of labour and assets in both countries, 50% of these factors are allocated to each company. As liq-
uid funds are invested in the capital market and not in real investment projects of the companies, we further 
assume that no additional assets are purchased and no additional workforce is hired in the period under re-
view. Vice versa, we assume that the companies do not sell part of their assets or reduce workforce in loss-
making periods. Thus, the magnitude of assets and labour is assumed to remain constant. Also Eberhartinger 
and Petutschnig (2014) assume in their game-theoretic analysis that assets are distributed equally between 
their two considered countries. For a detailed examination of potential effects of real investments on appor-
tionment factors see Dietrich and Kiesewetter (2007), p. 507. 
26
  The share of the sales factor, which is allocated to each company, is approximated by the relation of the pre-
tax cash flows of the respective company to the pre-tax cash flows of the group. We assume that the German 
company sells to German clients, and the French company to French clients. The companies are assumed to 
not export to other countries. 
27
  In an alternative approach, we assume that the apportionment factor β is fixed and constant over time and thus 
it is independent of the magnitude of the pre-tax cash flows. Untabulated results show that this variation has 
little impact on our results even if the apportionment factor β takes on extreme values of zero or one. 
28
  This is the case if the absolute value of negative earnings of one company is greater than or equal to the posi-
tive earnings of the other company, or both group companies incur negative or zero earnings in the first peri-
od. 
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well. Thus, by increasing earnings in the first period, more taxes must be paid in relation to the pre-tax 
cash flows of € 100,000, what results in lower future values for the group. 
 
Fig. 1 Future values under the CCCTB system 
 
5.2.2.  System of separate accounting 
In Fig. 2 we show the MNG’s future values under the system of SA. Due to the application of SA in 
determining the tax burden of the group companies, and due to increased complexity with regard to 
the treatment of losses, this graph is more complex than that in Fig. 1. All losses may be utilized for 
tax purposes if neither the loss carry-back restriction nor the minimum taxation applies for the compa-
nies. This is the case if the earnings of both group companies range between - € 1.2 million and € 1 
million in the first period (area A in Fig. 2). Thus, area A represents scenarios with full loss utilization. 
In area A, future values are not identical but only differ slightly. The highest future value under the 
system of SA amounts to € 173,789. 
If the earnings of the German and/or French group company exceeds € 1 million in the first period, the 
loss carry-back restriction will apply in the second period. The minimum taxation applies in the sec-
ond period, given that the earnings of the respective group companies fall below -€ 1.2 million in the 
first period. The future values decrease with increasing/decreasing earnings of the group companies in 
the first period if the earnings exceed the respective limits for the loss carry-back restriction and/or the 
minimum taxation. The more the earnings exceed these limits, the smaller the share of the overall 
losses that may be utilized during the given time frame and the smaller the resulting future values. 
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Fig. 2 Future values under the system of separate accounting 
 
As long as only one of the two group companies may not entirely utilize its losses in the given time 
frame but the respective other company may do so, the future values of the group range between areas 
B (loss carry-back restriction applies to the German company), D (loss carry-back restriction applies 
to the French company), F (minimum taxation applies to the German company) or H (minimum taxa-
tion applies to the French company). If both of the group companies may not entirely utilize their loss-
es, the future value lies in areas C (loss carry-back restriction applies to both companies), E (minimum 
taxation applies to the German company and the loss carry-back restriction applies to the French com-
pany), G (minimum taxation applies to both companies) or I (loss carry-back restriction applies to the 
German company and minimum taxation applies to the French company). The lowest future value (-€ 
696,755) of the group arises if the earnings of both group entities take the highest values considered in 
this analysis (i.e. approximately € 3 million), as then due to the loss carry-back restriction the largest 
share of losses remains unused. 
We find that the time pattern of the profits/losses streams and, arising from this, the divergent oppor-
tunities to utilize the upcoming losses are the key drivers of the MNG’s future values under both tax 
systems in our setting. 
5.3 Favourable tax system depending on time structure and magnitude of earnings 
The following graph illustrates which of the two underlying tax systems is advantageous for which 
combinations of earnings of the French company and the German company, based on the future values 
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shown in the previous two graphs (Fig. 1 and 2).  
As the graph in Fig. 3 shows, the CCCTB system is advantageous for most of the plotted earnings. 
The graph shows 961 combinations, and for 622 of them the CCCTB system is preferable. However, 
the system of SA is advantageous if the German and French earnings are positive in the first period or 
if they are slightly negative for one group entity and positive for the other. 
 
Fig. 3 SA vs. CCCTB depending on earnings of both companies 
 
Depending on different time patterns of the entities’ earnings we identify four different tax effects that 
are crucial for the relative attractiveness of either system. The magnitude of each of these four effects 
determines whether the one or the other tax system is overall preferable: 
• loss utilization effect: This effect refers to the share of overall group losses that may be offset 
against profits under each tax system. The evaluation of the remaining loss carry-forwards at the 
end of the second period is also decisive for the advantageousness of each tax system; 
• dividend taxation effect: This effect is always to the disadvantage of the system of SA, as 5% of 
the intragroup dividends constitute a non-deductible expense for the German company. To 
check whether our results hold for fully tax-exempt dividends29 on the parent level, we conduct-
ed a sensitivity analysis and found in tendency corresponding results. 30  
• interest taxation effect: Given that the French subsidiary must take a loan from the German par-
ent, the interest payments in subsequent years are deductible in higher-taxed France and are 
taxed in the lower-taxed Germany under the system of SA. Intragroup loans are irrelevant for 
tax purposes under the CCCTB system. Thus, in this setting, the interest taxation effect always 
favours the system of SA;31  
                                                 
29
  Only in France, Germany, Italy and Belgium 5% of the gross dividend is subject to tax.  
30
  Only in some exceptional cases our results change. 
31
  The interest taxation effect occurs only if the French subsidiary incurs losses in the first period and thus takes 
a loan in the first period. Consequently, it pays interest in the second period. 
-€ 3 
-€ 2 
-€ 1 
€ 0 
€ 1 
€ 2 
€ 3 
-€ 3 -€ 2 -€ 1 € 0 € 1 € 2 € 3 
E
a
rn
in
g
s 
o
f 
th
e
 F
re
n
ch
 c
o
m
p
a
n
y
 i
n
 
t=
1
m
il
li
o
n
Earnings of the German company in t=1
million
SA advantageous
CCCTB advantageous
a 
 
c1 
c2 
b 
 19 
 
• tax base allocation effect: The shares of the overall group tax base that are taxed in 
France/Germany under the CCCTB system differ from the shares that are taxed under the sys-
tem of SA.32 
Generally speaking, the tax base allocation between the two companies tends to be more moderate 
under the CCCTB system than under the system of SA, due to consolidation and due to the equally-
allocated formula factors of assets and labour. As the French tax rate is higher than that in Germany 
((	
 < (
), it is desirable from the group’s perspective that most profits be taxed in Germany and 
most losses in France. However, as every company generates profits in one period and incurs losses in 
the other, the tax system that proves to be advantageous with regard to the tax base allocation in one 
period becomes disadvantageous in the other period. Thus, the tax base effects counterbalance each 
other to some extent during the periods under review. However, due to the positive present value of 
the pre-tax cash flows and due to the partly extinguished losses at the end of the second period, the 
impact of the tax base allocation in the profit period is stronger than that of the loss period. 
For the following interpretation, we first consider the combinations of earnings that result in a negative 
or zero CCCTB in the first period (combinations of area a, area a also includes also the diagonal line 
of the graph). A full utilization of losses may be achieved for all combinations of area a under the 
CCCTB system,33 but for only a few combinations under the system of SA, due to the loss carry-back 
restriction and the minimum taxation. Even in cases in which losses may be offset entirely under both 
systems, the dividend taxation under the system of SA ensures that the CCCTB system is always pref-
erable under such conditions. The interest taxation effect and – depending on the specific combina-
tions in area a – the possibly preferable tax base allocation under the system of SA are not strong 
enough to lead to a change in the ranking of the tax systems. 
In the following, we consider only the combinations above the line in Fig. 3. To compare the tax con-
sequences under the CCCTB system with those under the system of SA, we first focus on combina-
tions of only positive earnings of both companies in the first period (area b). For these combinations, 
the system of SA is always advantageous, mainly because the resulting losses of the second period 
may at least partially be carried back under the system of SA. In contrast, under the CCCTB system, 
the second period’s loss may not be utilized at all during the time frame under review, but must be 
carried forward and is valued at SDDDEF = 45%. The tax base allocation effect and the dividend taxa-
tion effect play rather minor roles and are crucial only in marginal cases. As the French company does 
not lack liquidity in the first period, the interest taxation effect does not appear. 
Next, we consider the tax consequences in the case where only one company incurs positive earnings 
                                                 
32
  Only in rare situations the tax base allocation under the CCCTB system and the system of SA might be lead to 
similar outcomes. 
33
 Compare with area 1 of Fig. 1. 
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and the other company incurs negative ones (area c1 and c2). Here, whether one or the other tax sys-
tem is advantageous depends on the specific combination of earnings of both companies. In area c2 
(c1) the German (French) company may carry back its losses of the second period and the French 
(German) company must carry forward the losses of the first period under the system of SA. Under the 
CCCTB system, the profits and losses of each group company may be offset cross-border in each pe-
riod. In both areas, the CCCTB is positive in the first period (all losses of the German (French) com-
pany may be offset cross-border in area c1 (c2)) and negative in the second period (the losses of the 
French (German) company exceed the profits of the German (French) company in area c1 (c2)). The 
system of SA is beneficial if the advantage from carrying back the second period’s losses of the Ger-
man (French) company (area c2 (c1)) is rather high. Specifically, the group benefits from SA if this 
advantage exceeds: 
• the benefit from a cross-border loss-offset under the CCCTB system; 
• the disadvantage of a loss carry-forward in the other company under SA in comparison to an 
immediate loss-offset under the CCCTB; 
• the disadvantage of the dividend taxation effect in period 1 (2) in area c1 (c2); and 
• in area c1, the disadvantage of the tax base allocation effect, which favours in this area the 
CCCTB system. 
The main driver of the results is the loss utilization effect. The interest taxation effect and the tax base 
allocation effect favour the system of SA in area c2, as well. Only for these combinations may the 
group deduct interest in higher-taxed France and tax them in Germany, and only for these combina-
tions more tax base is taxed in lower-taxed Germany under the system of SA than under the CCCTB 
system. Due to these two additional effects in favour of the system of SA, there are more combinations 
for which the system of SA is advantageous in area c2 than in area c1. As becomes apparent from Fig. 
3, with increasing earnings of the company that may make use of the loss carry-back provision (the 
German (French) company in area c2 (c1)), the system of SA remains advantageous only for decreas-
ing earnings of the other company. Under the system of SA, the relative share of utilizable losses de-
creases due to the loss carry-back restriction with increasing earnings, and thus the system of SA de-
clines in its relative advantageousness. Thus, it can remain advantageous only if the profits and losses 
under the CCCTB system are very unbalanced and the advantage from the cross-border loss-offset is 
rather low. This is the case when the earnings of the other company decrease. 
The following graph clarifies to what extent one or the other tax system is superior. It shows, by ex-
ample, the future value of the group for fixed German earnings of -€ 30,000 in the first period and for 
varying earnings for the French group under both systems. 
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Fig. 4 Future value of the MNG for a fixed value of German cash flows less depreciation of € 0 
 
 
The observable effects have been described previously. The graph shows that in the most extreme case 
(French earnings amount to -€ 3 million), the difference in future values between both systems 
amounts to approximately € 270,000. If the French earnings amount to € 0 the difference between both 
systems is the smallest with approximately € 900. The graph clarifies that the differences in future 
values between both systems vary considerably, from marginal to substantial differences. 
The unlimited loss carry-forward provision without minimum taxation and the possibility of a cross-
border loss-offset make the CCCTB system advantageous for most of the combinations considered. 
However, the system of SA becomes advantageous if the profit/loss streams allow the utilization of the 
loss carry-back provision. The dividend and interest taxation effect and the tax base allocation effect 
are not the main drivers of our results, but in borderline cases they can be decisive. In the next section 
we investigate the impact of the assumptions made for our model on our findings through a sensitivity 
analysis. 
5.4 Generalization of the model 
As the national loss-offset provisions in France and Germany are very specific, we broaden our analy-
sis to draw more generalizable conclusions. To capture the share of losses that can be offset under 
national laws we introduce loss-offset coefficients. The resulting model can be regarded as representa-
tive for the provision designs observable across Europe. We still distinguish between loss carry-back 
and loss carry-forward provisions.  
There are only five countries in the EU that allow for a loss carry-back. All of them are of high im-
portance either from an economic perspective, i.e., magnitude of economic activities (France, Germa-
ny, UK) or from a tax planning perspective of MNGs within Europe (the Netherlands, Ireland). The 
UK, the Netherlands and Ireland allow carrying losses back for one year unrestricted in amount. How-
ever, all EU countries allow to carry losses forward. We distinguish three different categories of coun-
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tries with different loss carry-forward provisions. First, there are countries that do not restrict loss 
carry-forwards at all; second, countries that restrict loss carry-forwards in amount; and third, countries 
that restrict them in time. The following table (Tab. 1) gives an overview of the loss-offset provisions 
across Europe (see IBFD 2015). 
Loss carry-back, one 
year, if limited then 
maximal amount in 
brackets 
France (€ 1 million), Germany (€ 1 million), 
Ireland, Malta, Netherlands, UK 
 
Unrestricted loss  
carry-forward 
Belgium, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Sweden, UK  
 
Loss carry-forward  
restricted in amount 
(share of current year’s 
taxable income against 
which losses can be 
offset) 
Austria 75% 
Denmark 60%,  
but basic amount of DDK 7,747,500 
France 50%, 
but basic amount of  € 1 million  
Germany 60%, 
but basic amount of € 1 million  
Hungary 50% and 5 years 
Italy 80% 
Lithuania 70% 
Poland 50% and 5 years  
Portugal 70% and 12 years 
Slovenia 50% 
Spain depending on the turnover 25%-50% 
of losses can be offset in 2015,  
for future periods this share will be 
increased 
Loss carry-forward  
restricted in time 
(years) 
Bulgaria 5 
Croatia 5 
Cyprus 5 
Czech Republic 5 
Finland 10 
Greece 5 
Romania  7 
Slovak Republic 4,  
but losses carried forward evenly 
The Netherlands 9 
 
Tab. 1 Loss-offset provisions in EU Member States 
In the following, we use the set of equations as introduced in Section 4.1 and extend it with respect to 
differently determined loss-offsets ,-	and loss carry-backs ,). The factor η indicates the share of 
the adjusted gross income *+ of each company against which loss carry-forwards from previous 
periods can be offset. The factor pi captures the share of the tax base of the previous period ) 
against which current losses can be offset. We then obtain 
,- = 4 :,; !1η ∗ *+; 02C, (16) 
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,) = min :max"π ∗ TB= ; 0';max"−AGI=AB; 0'C. (17) 
A subset of EU countries allows to infinitely carry forward losses but has not implemented a loss car-
ry-back provision in the national tax code. For such countries η is equal to one and π is equal to zero. 
In such cases the loss-offset provisions under separate accounting and CCCTB are identical, except for 
the cross-border loss-offset under CCCTB. We find that under such parameter settings for both coun-
tries the CCCTB system is always preferable for the MNG. The dividend and interest taxation effect 
and – depending on the combinations of earnings – the cross-border loss-offset or the higher valuation 
of remaining losses under the CCCTB system, respectively, are crucial for this result. 
Under this set of parameters (η = 1,π = 0), we find more interesting results if we disregard the 5%-
dividend taxation under the system of SA. Non-dividend taxation is representative for most EU coun-
tries as the 5%-dividend taxation exists only in four EU countries, i.e., Belgium, Italy, Germany and 
France. As shown in Fig. 5, the system of SA is preferable under such parameter settings for about one 
eighth of the illustrated combinations of French and German earnings. The advantageousness of the 
system of SA is solely caused by the tax base allocation effect, i.e., more losses are allocated to high-
er-taxed France under the system of SA than under the CCCTB system. Note that also for countries 
that restrict the loss carry-forward in time a picture similar to the one displayed in Fig. 5 emerges. 
Here, the pre-tax present value of earnings of € 100,000 of each company ensures that all of the first 
periods’ losses can be utilized in the second period and that the timely loss-offset restrictions do not 
apply. Thus, the national tax codes of the vast majority of the EU countries provide conditions that 
lead to the system of SA being preferable for some combinations of French and German earnings only 
because of tax base effects. By contrast, assuming that the 5%-dividend taxation applies, the system of 
SA is preferable only for countries that allow for a loss carry-back. 
 
Fig. 5 SA vs. CCCTB, no dividend taxation, no loss carry-back pi = 0, full loss carry-forward η = 1 
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We employ the example of domestic loss-offset possibilities in selected European countries to show 
how the relation between the loss carry-forward and carry-back provisions determines the relative 
advantageousness of the system of SA. First, taking the UK and Ireland as examples for non-dividend 
taxation, we investigate how an unlimited loss carry-forward and a one-year loss carry-back affect the 
relative advantageousness of the system of SA. Fig. 6 illustrates the results. 100% of all of the second 
periods’ losses of each entity can be carried back and all of the first periods’ losses can be utilized in 
the following period. Thus, the system of SA gains in relative advantageousness in comparison to the 
Franco-German case. As Fig. 6 shows in comparison to Fig. 4, there are significantly more cases in 
which the system of SA becomes preferable if the cash flow streams are opposing in their time pattern 
(see the enlargement of the blue triangular area to the upper left and the lower right corner in Fig. 6 in 
comparison to Fig. 4). 
 
Fig. 6 SA vs. CCCTB, unrestricted loss carry-forward η = 1and loss carry-back pi = 1 
 
In a next step, we vary the parameters for the loss carry-forward and for the loss carry-back. First, we 
run the analysis assuming that a minimum taxation at a rate of 50% (η = 0.5) and a full loss carry-
back (π = 1) applies, see Fig. 7, left graph. This case might appear in the Netherlands if loss carry-
forwards cannot be entirely utilized as the time restriction applies. As a consequence, the present value 
of the resulting future tax refunds decreases, which is captured here by the coefficient η set equal to 
50%. Second, we assume that only 50% of losses can be carried back (π = 0.5) but all of the losses 
can be carried forward without restrictions (η = 1), see Fig. 7, right graph. Within EU countries such a 
case cannot appear, since there is no country that restricts the loss carry-backs pro rata. However, we 
run this analysis because it gives insights in the relative importance of the loss carry-back in relation to 
the loss carry-forward provision and thereby opens our analysis to scenarios beyond the currently ob-
servable institutional settings in the EU. 
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Notes: left graph: unrestricted loss carry-forward η = 1, restricted loss carry-back pi	= 0.5; right graph: minimum taxation 
applies η = 0.5, full loss carry-back pi	= 1 
Fig. 7 SA vs. CCCTB, variation of loss carry-forward and carry-back parameters 
 
Fig. 7 shows that the 50%-restriction of the loss carry-back or the loss carry-forward lead to approxi-
mately the same amount of cases in which the system of SA is advantageous. Both restrictions make 
the system of SA relatively less attractive for MNGs. The effects of both restrictions on the advanta-
geousness of the system of SA are strictly linear. The higher the restriction, the smaller the future val-
ues under the system of SA. 
5.5 Sensitivity analysis  
In this subsection we examine the robustness of the previous results. To this end, different parameter 
variations are applied. If not stated differently the parameter settings are as in the Franco-German base 
scenario. In three steps, we analyse, ceteris paribus, the influence on the results of the evaluation of 
the remaining losses at the end of the second period, we allow for behavioural adjustments under the 
CCCTB system in order to take advantage of tax rate differentials and finally we have broadened the 
scope of the earnings for both group companies while retaining the parameter settings of the base sce-
nario. 
First, we analyse the impact of the valuation of the remaining loss carry-forwards at the end of the 
second period. In the basic scenario we argued that the chance for using losses entirely is higher under 
the CCCTB system. However, this must not necessarily be the case as under certain conditions the 
loss-offset under both systems might be similar. In order to find out to what extent the higher valuation 
of the remaining losses under the CCCTB system (SDDDEF = 45%) drives the results, we first assume 
that remaining losses are valued equally under both tax systems. Fig. 8 shows the results for the two 
extreme cases, i.e. that losses are not utilizable at all in the future (SDDDEF=S=0%) or that losses are 
fully utilizable (SDDDEF=S=100%) under both systems. By varying the portion of utilizable losses 
equally under both systems, the figures illustrate that higher loss utilization favours CCCTB. The 
CCCTB system turns to be advantageous in such areas in which the remaining loss carry-forwards are 
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higher under the CCCTB system than under SA, i.e., in cases in which the MNG can make use of the 
loss carry-back provision under SA. Thus, if the valuation of the remaining loss carry-forwards is sim-
ilar under both systems, the CCCTB system benefits more strongly from an increase in the level of 
loss utilization. 
 
Notes: left graph: no loss carry-forward S=0%; right graph: loss carry-forwards are valued at S=100% under both tax systems 
Fig. 8: SA vs. CCCTB depending on earnings of both companies, loss carry-forwards are valued equally under both systems 
Next, we assume that the valuation of losses differs more fundamentally between the system of SA 
and the CCCTB system. Fig. 9 provides information on how much the CCCTB system benefits from a 
bigger valuation gap between the two systems. Even if the valuation difference of loss carry-forwards 
is 60 percentage points between the two systems (right graph of Fig. 9), there are some combinations 
under which the system of SA is still advantageous. The system of SA remains advantageous for those 
combinations that allow to carry the second period’s losses completely back (i.e., the area in which the 
earnings of the first period are close to € 1 million). 
 
 
Notes: left graph:	S = 40%, SDDDEF = 60%; right graph: S = 20%, SDDDEF = 80% 
Fig. 9: SA vs. CCCTB depending on earnings of both companies, different valuation of loss carry-forwards  
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The sensitivity analysis shows so far that the evaluation of losses has an impact on our results but does 
not affect them heavily. Even in extreme cases the conclusions drawn from the basic scenario hold.  
Next, we extend our approach and account for behavioural reactions. We assume that the MNG can 
adjust the allocation of assets and labour between Germany and France in order to benefit from tax 
rate differentials under the CCCTB system. The allocation of sales between the two countries is – like 
in the base scenario – still determined by the cash flows in each country. We refer to studies on 
MNG’s reactions to changed factor weights under the formulary apportionment system at the US state 
level to make an educated guess about the shifting potential. Those studies indicate that a change in 
factor weights effectuates a change in effective tax rates of US states. Whereas Weiner (1994) and 
Lightner (1999) did not find any significant evidence of MNG’s reactions in factor allocation at all, 
Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) find evidence that a reduction in the labour factor weight from one third 
to one fourth increases employment in the manufacturing sector significantly by 1,1%. Consequently, 
empirical evidence from the US indicates that at least the short-term responses in activity shifting on 
tax rate differentials seem to be very small. However, conversely to empirical evidence, in order to 
scrutinize the impact of the shifting factor G, we assume that the MNG is able to shift 100% of assets 
and labour within its entities as the most extreme scenario. Fig. 10 illustrates the advantageousness of 
either tax system when the MNG shifts all of its assets and labour in the profit period to the lower-tax 
country Germany. As losses are not allocated to the group entities under the CCCTB system but rather 
carried-forward on the group level, the factor allocation does not change the relative attractiveness of 
this tax regime if the CCCTB is negative. Fig. 10 clarifies that even in this extreme setting, which 
highly overstates the empirical evidence from the US, our results remain robust. We conclude from 
this investigation that abstracting from behavioural responses under the CCCTB system is justified as 
the impact of such responses are rather negligible.  
 
 
Fig. 10: SA vs. CCCTB depending on earnings of both companies, assets and labour can be fully shifted 
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Last but not least, we broaden the scope for the earnings to be considered. Instead of considering earn-
ings from approximately minus € 3 million to plus € 3 million, as in the base scenario, we now consid-
er earnings from approximately minus € 60 million to plus € 60 million.34 The values for the German 
and French earnings are now plotted in increments of € 500,000. The parameter settings remain the 
same as those in the base scenario. The following graph shows only the results for positive earnings of 
both group companies (comparable to area b of Fig. 3). For the remaining combinations, the results do 
not add anything new to the findings of the base scenario. 
Fig. 11 SA vs. CCCTB depending on a broader scope of earnings 
Fig. 11 shows that the system of SA is advantageous only up to a limited amount of positive earnings 
of the French and German company in the first period. The main reason for this is that there is a break-
even-point where the advantage of the utilization of a larger share of losses under the system of SA 
due to the loss carry-back, is overcompensated by the effects of a higher value of the remaining losses 
at the end of the second period under the CCCTB system (SDDDEF = 0.45, S = 0.4). 
The area in Fig. 11 for which the system of SA is advantageous is triangular shaped. The triangle can 
be described by its apexes and the point of origin. Specific combinations of German and French earn-
ings determine the edge and apexes of the triangle, and thus the break-even point of SA and CCCTB’s 
relative attractiveness. Under the given set of assumptions: 
• the German earnings are limited to € 1 million and the French earnings are limited to € 10.5 mil-
lion (top apex); or 
 
• the French earnings amount to € 1 million and the German earnings amount to € 56.5 million  
(right apex) 
in the first period to favour SA. The upper and right apex of the triangle result mainly from the loss 
carry-back provision under the system of SA: The relative advantage of the system of SA over the 
CCCTB system is highest if the earnings of German or French company takes on a value of € 1 mil-
lion, as the benefit from the loss carry-back provision is maximal then. Due to the high relative advan-
                                                 
34
  By considering a broader scope, the interest payments can be higher than € 150,000. See footnote 40. Howev-
er, even in cases with high losses the thin capitalization rule does not apply for the French company because 
we assume that the indebtness condition (safe haven) is not violated. See Gaoua (2014), p. 26. 
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tageousness of the system of SA over the CCCTB system for earnings of € 1 million for one company 
in the first period, the system of SA remains advantageous even if the earnings of the other company 
are very high in the first period. Very high earnings in the first period imply that the share of utilizable 
losses is, due to the application of the loss carry-back restriction, rather low in the second period. 
The CCCTB system turns out to be advantageous for lower French earnings (top apex) than for Ger-
man earnings (right apex). There are two reasons for this imbalance. First, dividend taxation under the 
system of SA for increasing French earnings favours the CCCTB system. Second, the tax base alloca-
tion for increasing French earnings favours the CCCTB system, as well, because – compared to the 
system of SA – a lower share of the group tax base is taxed in higher-taxed France in the profit peri-
od.35,36 
Our sensitivity analysis shows that the results are dependent on the evaluation of the remaining losses 
at the end of the second period. Improved utilization of the remaining losses under both tax systems 
has a clear effect in favour of the CCCTB system. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that allowing for 
behavioural adjustments under the CCCTB system changes the overall results only slightly in favour 
of the CCCTB system. Both of previous variations do not challenge the basic findings of our analysis. 
By broadening the magnitude for earnings of both group companies, we show that the advantageous-
ness of the system of SA for positive French earnings is limited to rather low values. 
6 Conclusion 
We have analysed the conditions under which the CCCTB system or the system of SA will be advan-
tageous for an MNG of which the member companies incur temporary losses. The focus on losses is 
particularly relevant and noteworthy, as the recent crisis led to enormous loss carry-forwards in MNGs 
and, furthermore, innovative activities like start-ups and R&D investment, which are crucial for MNG 
future performance, usually are characterized by initial losses. Against this background, it is vital to 
investigate the implications of the tax environment for temporarily loss-making MNGs. 
While prior research focuses mainly on the differences in economic behaviour under both systems in 
general, we study the conditions under which one or the other tax system is preferable from the per-
spective of an MNG, with a particular focus on loss-offsets. We simulate possible decision scenarios 
of MNG to ascertain under which conditions MNGs are likely to opt for the CCCTB system. We focus 
on European MNGs with losses at the parent and subsidiary levels. We build a tailor-made, numerical 
model for a representative MNG. To demonstrate typical differences between the respective national 
                                                 
35
  The effects of the tax base allocation in the profit period exceed that of the loss period. See Section 5.3. 
36
  By considering a broader scope of earnings, the tax base allocation effect becomes more important, as under 
separate accounting the allocation for the group tax base between the two companies can become more ex-
treme. In some settings, low profits of one company meet very high profits of the other company. Thus, the 
first company maintains a very small share of the group tax base, while the latter company retains a very large 
one. In contrast, under the CCCTB system, the allocation of the tax base is smoother. 
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loss-offset provisions and that of the CCCTB system, we consider a group the parent of which is dom-
iciled in Germany, with a subsidiary in France. France and Germany allow losses to be carried back. 
By considering different magnitudes and time sequences of profit/loss streams of each group compa-
ny, we vary the degree to which the MNG may utilize its losses by carrying them back and/or forward. 
We aim to focus only on differences inherent in the tax systems. Thus, we disregard behavioural adap-
tations in order to reduce tax payments under the respective systems. 
We find mixed results. We identify four effects that determine the decision of an MNG: the tax-
utilization of losses, the allocation of the tax base to the respective group companies, dividend taxation 
and intragroup interest taxation. We find that the CCCTB system proves advantageous for increasing 
loss/profit streams (e.g. from start-ups or R&D projects) of the single group entities, whereas the sys-
tem of SA is beneficial for decreasing profit/loss streams (e.g. caused by a decrease in return from a 
mature product). The loss-offset under the CCCTB system has two major advantages compared to the 
system of SA: no minimum taxation is applicable and cross-border loss-offsets are possible. The in-
herent advantage of the French and German national tax regimes under the system of SA, is the possi-
bility to carry back losses. We conclude that the possibility of carrying losses back is decisive for the 
advantageousness of the system of SA in the Franco-German context. 
If the MNG’s entities carry out projects that result in opposing profit/loss streams, the CCCTB system 
will, in most cases, be advantageous, as losses may be offset cross-border. However, counter-
intuitively, the CCCTB system is not unconditionally preferable in cases where a cross-border loss-
offset is applicable. Rather, it is the magnitude of these entities’ profits and losses that determines 
whether the CCCTB system is worthwhile. If the CCCTB is initially positive but becomes negative 
over time and, furthermore, if the relationship between the losses and profits of the respective group 
entities is rather unbalanced, the decision not to opt for the CCCTB system tends to be attractive. The 
reason is that losses may be utilized earlier under the system of SA, thanks to the loss carry-back pro-
vision. However, if the CCCTB is initially negative and becomes positive over time, the results of the 
analysis point towards choosing the CCCTB system, as in these constellations at least some of the 
losses may be utilized immediately, thanks to the cross-border loss-offset, while any remaining losses 
may be carried forward without limitation. 
Furthermore, our findings suggest that the CCCTB system tends always to be advantageous if only 
one of the group companies incurs high initial losses that are followed by high profits. Such extreme 
profit/loss streams are typical for projects that involve high initial R&D expense, for example in the 
pharmaceutical industry. The advantageousness of the CCCTB system in such cases is explained by 
the application of the minimum taxation under the system of SA, which strongly restricts the loss-
offset for the extreme profit/loss streams considered here. 
Moreover, our analysis highlights the impact of the intercompany interest and dividend taxation on the 
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advantageousness of the system of SA. Whereas the dividend taxation is always to the disadvantage of 
the system of SA, the intercompany interest taxation can favour it if the interest payments are deducti-
ble in the high-tax country.  We broaden the Franco-German example towards a general European 
perspective and elaborate the effects resulting from differently designed loss-offset provisions and 
from different tax treatment of dividends. Addressing a variety of loss-offset provisions that exist 
across Europe allows us assessing more adequately how the design of loss-offset provisions impacts 
the advantageousness of each tax system. Taking exemplarily the UK and Ireland, we find that an 
unlimited loss carry-forward and a one-year loss carry-back favours the system of SA clearly. In such 
case the number of combinations for which the system of SA is advantageous increases by about 50%. 
Furthermore, the generalized model clarifies that in case of no dividend taxation and in case of an 
unlimited loss carry-forward and no loss carry-back (like, e.g., in Sweden or Luxembourg) the tax 
base effects alone ensure that the system of SA is advantageous for one eighth of combinations. 
Our findings must be interpreted against the background of our set of assumptions. The results are 
partially driven by the evaluation of remaining losses at the end of the second period. A better utiliza-
tion of losses may fundamentally benefit the CCCTB system. However, the results of the sensitivity 
analysis clarify that even if we vary the loss-offset possibilities strongly in favour of the CCCTB sys-
tem, there still remain combinations for which the system of SA is advantageous. Thus, our basic con-
clusions are not challenged by the assumptions about the loss carry-forwards at the end of the second 
period. Furthermore, broadening the range of earnings reveals that the system of SA can be advanta-
geous only for combinations that include relatively low profits of both companies in the first period. 
Consequently, the sensitivity analysis reveals that our outcomes are not limited to just specific numer-
ical examples, but can – to some extent – be generalized. Moreover, the sensitivity analysis points out 
that our results change only marginally if we allow for behavioural adjustments under the CCCTB 
system in order to take advantage of tax rate differentials. Our results are helpful in revealing the con-
ditions under which it is advisable to opt for the CCCTB system. Moreover, they may also contribute 
to the discussion of corporate group tax harmonization within other economic zones, such as the Unit-
ed States. 
Our analysis contributes three important findings to the existing literature. First, in addition to the tax 
base allocation effect,37 it identifies further determinants that potentially have a decisive influence on 
the choice of the preferable tax systems, namely the dividend and interest taxation effect and the loss 
utilization effect. Second, as some prior studies deny the economic significance of the loss carry-back 
provision (see Haegert and Kramm 1977; Dwenger 2008; Dreßler and Overesch 2013), our study 
demonstrates that this provision does have a significant impact at least with regard to the choice of the 
preferable tax system. Third, our study makes clear that the intercompany loss-offset across borders 
                                                 
37
  Prior analytical studies focus mainly on the tax base allocation influenced by income shifting (see Nielsen et 
al. 2010; Gérard and Princen 2012; Martini et al. 2012). 
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under the CCCTB system is not necessarily preferable over the intertemporal loss-offset under the 
system of SA. 
Whether the CCCTB proposal will be adopted is, in fact, far from certain. In moving toward its adop-
tion by the EU, there has been a public debate on various adjustments to its provisions. Two of the 
many aspects under discussion are whether a common tax base without consolidation (CCTB) could 
prove acceptable and whether to implement the minimum taxation based on the German model. Our 
results indicate that each of these amendments would have a fundamental impact on the relative ad-
vantageousness of the CCCTB system and would substantially decrease its attractiveness for MNGs. If 
both of the restrictions under discussion were applied, scarcely any incentive would remain for Fran-
co-German MNGs to opt for the CCCTB system. 
There are still several important issues that have not yet been sufficiently addressed. For instance, our 
results indicate the difficulty of determining the optimal timing for a company’s decision to opt for the 
CCCTB system. This merits more careful examination in future research so that the overall tax effects 
in a dynamic setting that may arise as a consequence of the transition to the new system, can be antici-
pated. 
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